Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary
Volume 39

Issue 2

Article 1

3-1-2020

Safeguarding Procedures Under the IDEA: Restoring the Balance
in the Adjudication of FAPE
Perry A. Zirkel
paz0@lehigh.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the
Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Perry A. Zirkel, Safeguarding Procedures Under the IDEA: Restoring the Balance in the Adjudication of
FAPE, 39 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 1 (2020)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol39/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Safeguarding Procedures Under the IDEA:
Restoring the Balance in the Adjudication of FAPE
By Perry A. Zirkel* © 2020
I.
II.

III.

PROCEDURAL DIMENSONS OF FAPE ......................................................................................................... 3
THE SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCEDURAL DIMENSION ................................................. 5
A.
Pre-2004 Judicial Interpretation .............................................................................................. 5
B.
IDEA 2004 Codification ............................................................................................................... 6
C.
Post-2004 Judicial Interpretation ............................................................................................ 7
D.
Alternate Forum Interpretation............................................................................................. 12
THE REMEDIAL SOLUTION ........................................................................................................................ 12

2

39-2
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

Initiated as funding legislation in 1975 and amended periodical
reauthorizations,1 the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)2 provides a detailed framework of procedural requirements
focused on the obligation of providing a “free appropriate public
education” (FAPE)3 to each student with a disability. 4 These
procedural requirements include, for example, the FAPE delivery
vehicle of an individualized education program (IEP),5 the
administrative adjudicatory dispute resolution mechanism of an
impartial due process hearing,6 and specialized notices for various
stages of this process.7
In the landmark case Board of Education v. Rowley in 1982,8 the
Supreme Court concluded that FAPE has two prongs—procedural
compliance and a less specific substantive standard.9 In the
succeeding decades, the courts have gradually eroded the procedural
dimension to the point of near distinction by giving preemptive effect
to the substantive dimension.10
* Perry A. Zirkel is University Professor Emeritus of Education and Law at
Lehigh University. He acknowledges with appreciation the review of this
manuscript by Ann Vevier Lockwood, who is a long-time and well-respected
hearing officer in Texas.
1
The successive reauthorizations included the 1986 amendments, Education of
the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99 § 457, 100 Stat. 1145
(1986) (amended 1990), which included attorneys’ fees for prevailing parents; the
1990 amendments, Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101 § 476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (amended 1991), which provided, inter
alia, the IDEA as the new name for the original Education of the Handicapped Act;
the 1997 amendments, Individuals with Disabilities Act Amendments of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105 § 17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (amended 2004), which included major
provisions for discipline of students with disabilities; and the most recent 2004
amendments, Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108, § 446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004), which included fine-tuning several
provisions of the Act. For historical perspectives, see Edward W. Martin, Reed
Martin, & Donna L. Terman, The Legislative and Litigation History of Special
Education, 6 FUTURE OF CHILD. 25 (1996); Mitchell Yell, David Rogers, &
Elisabeth Lodge Rogers, The Legal History of Special Education, 19 REMEDIAL &
SPECIAL EDUC. 219 (1998).
2
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–19 (2017).
3
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2017). E.g., Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538
F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir. 2008) (characterized FAPE as “the central pillar of the
IDEA statutory structure”).
4
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3), 1412(a)(1)(A) (2017).
5
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d) (2017). E.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,
311 (1988) (characterizing the IEP as “the primary vehicle” of the IDEA).
6
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(i) (2017).
7
20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)–(d) (2017).
8
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley (Rowley), 458
U.S. 176 (1982).
9
Id. at 182, 187–91.
10
See M.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty, 303 F.3d 523, 533
(4th Cir. 2002) (“When such a procedural defect exists, we are obliged to assess
whether it resulted in the loss of an educational opportunity for the disabled
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The article’s purpose is to stimulate IDEA adjudicators, starting
with the specialized and significant level of impartial hearing
officers,11 and to restore the enforceable meaning of the procedural
requirements of the IDEA. Doing so will provide a more coherent
balance with not only the substantive dimension, but also the other
decisional dispute resolution mechanisms of the Act. 12 Part I
provides an overview of the procedural structure of the IDEA and the
Supreme Court’s framework interpretation.13 Part II traces the
subsequent interpretation of the procedural dimension of FAPE,
culminating in the codification of the two-part test in the latest IDEA
amendments.14 Part III proposes an adjudicative approach for
enforcing the procedural dimension of FAPE. 15
I. PROCEDURAL DIMENSIONS OF FAPE
The IDEA regulation’s requirements supplement the IDEA
legislation,16 which consists of approximately fifty pages specific to
public schools.17 The detailed procedural provisions extend from the
state to the local level.18 In an analysis of part of the procedural
child”); Sch. Bd. of Collier Cty. v. K.C. ex rel. SWC, 285 F.3d 977, 982 (11th Cir.
2002) (reciting the test for a “procedurally defective IEP” as whether it “failed to
provide [the child] with any educational benefit”); T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54,
265 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (“If there has been no substantive
deprivation, procedural defects do not amount to a denial of FAPE”).
11
E.g., Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Consol. Sch., 208 F.3d 560, 566–
67 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the specialized expertise of IDEA hearing officers
as compared to the federal judiciary); Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy Skidmore, Judicial
Appeal of Due Process Hearing Rulings: The Extent and Direction of Decisional
Change, 29 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 22 (2017) (finding that in almost three
quarters of the cases the final court decision upheld the hearing officer’s rulings
with slight or no change).
12
E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA’s Dispute Resolution
Processes—Complaint Procedures and Impartial Hearings: An Update, 369 EDUC.
L. REP. 550 (2019) (providing a detailed comparison of the administrative
adjudicative mechanism of the IDEA, the impartial hearing, with its corresponding
administrative investigative avenue, the complaint procedures mechanism under 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.151–300.15 (2018); Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Decisional Processes
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Empirical Comparison,
16 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 169 (2017) (An Empirical Comparison) (providing a
comparative analysis of the frequency and outcomes of issue rulings under the
impartial hearing and complaint procedures avenues of the IDEA).
13
See infra Part I.
14
See infra Part II.
15
See infra Part II.
16
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1(a)–(d) (2018).
17
20 U.S.C §§ 1400–1419 (2017). These sections are Part B, which applies to
eligible children ages three to twenty-one, but the statute is even longer in its
entirety, extending to 20 U.S.C. § 1482 (2017).
18
34 C.F.R. § 300.1(c) (2018) (stating “[t]o assist States, localities, educational
agencies, and Federal agencies to provide for the education of all children with
disabilities”).
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dimension of the IDEA at the local level, 19 Zirkel and Hetrick
identified at least four major and various miscellaneous school district
requirements for each of these core FAPE categories: (1) IEP
components, (2) IEP team, and (3) IEP development, revision, and
effectuation.20
The Supreme Court in its aforementioned 21 landmark Rowley
decision recognized the separable importance of the Act’s procedural
framework in delineating the meaning of FAPE under the IDEA. 22
Specifically, the Court placed at least equal emphasis on procedural
compliance as substantive quality in its foundational reasoning:
When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards . . .
are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive
admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the importance
Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid.
It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit
as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures . . . as it did
upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive
standard. We . . . [infer] the legislative conviction that adequate
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases
assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of
substantive content in an IEP. 23
The Court reasoned that the detailed procedural provisions would
open the door to the requisite education 24 and interpreted the Act’s
vague FAPE definition to provide only a rather low floor once
inside.25 As a result, the Court divined a two-pronged standard, with
apparent primacy and stringency on the first dimension. Specifically,
to determine compliance with the standard, the Court set forth these
adjudicative questions: “[f]irst, has the State complied with the
procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized
19

This compilation did not extend to the procedural requirements at the school
district level for child find (34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2018)) and eligibility (34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.306–300.311 (2018)); least restrictive environment (34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114–
300.116 (2018)); parental consent (34 C.F.R. §§ 300.300 (2018)); discipline (34
C.F.R. §§ 300.530–300.536 (2018)); parentally placed private school children (34
C.F.R. §§ 300.131–300.140 (2018)); interagency cooperation (34 C.F.R. § 300.154
(2018)); the dispute resolution processes (34 C.F.R §§ 300.151–300.153; 300.506–
300.515 (2018)) and remedies (34 C.F.R. § 300.148 (2018)).
20
Perry A. Zirkel & Allyse Hetrick, Which Procedural Parts of the IDEA Are
the Most Judicially Vulnerable? 83 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 219, 224 (2017).
21
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–08.
22
Id.
23
Id. 205–06.
24
Id. at 192. “[T]he intent of the Act was more to open the door of public
education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any
particular level of education once inside.” Id.
25
Id. at 201. “[T]he ‘basic floor of opportunity’ provided by the Act consists of
access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.” Id.
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educational program developed through the Act's procedures
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits?”26
II. THE SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCEDURAL
DIMENSION
The post-Rowley interpretations of the procedural prong extended
both vertically in chronological phases and horizontally in subject
matter scope.27 The phases were before and after the 2004 IDEA
amendments28 whereas the scope started with the core meaning of
FAPE and extended to the full range of procedural issues, including
child find.29
A. Pre-2004 Judicial Interpretations
Rather than strict application, the Rowley progeny gradually
developed a harmless error approach to procedural FAPE largely
culminating in the application of the relatively relaxed substantive
standard.30 Initially, a few jurisdictions stopped at the determination
of whether the school district violated one or more of the procedural
requirements of the IDEA, thus amounting to a per se approach. 31
Eventually, however, the prevailing approach added a second step for
cases in which the court determined that there was a violation. 32 In
the majority of these Rowley progeny cases, the question for the
second step was whether the procedural violation resulted in a
substantive loss to the student,33 thus having the effect of Rowley’s
26

Id. at 206–07.
See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Is it Time for Elevating the Standard for FAPE
under IDEA?, 79 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 497 (2013) (Elevating the Standard for
FAPE); Stacy Inman & Darren Bogie, Child Find How to Find the Children Before
the Parents Find You, SCH. LEGAL SERV. 1 (2015),
http://schoolslegalservice.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2016/02/B-Child-FindSLI.pdf.
28
See generally Elevating the Standard for FAPE, supra note 27.
29
E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 2007);
D.K. ex rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir 2012).
30
Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE, 33 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 215, 237 (2013).
31
E.g., Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in
Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. LEG. 415, 435–37 (2011) (canvassing the
initial chaotic variety of approaches but, via a case study of the Fourth Circuit,
showing the movement from the per se to the majority approach of requiring a
substantive loss to the student as the second step).
32
See id.
33
E.g., MM ex rel. DM, 303 F.3d at 533 (“When such a procedural defect
exists, we are obliged to assess whether it resulted in the loss of an educational
opportunity for the disabled child”); Sch. Bd. of Collier Cty., 285 F.3d at 982
(reciting the test for a “procedurally defective IEP” as whether it “failed to provide
27
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second prong swallowing its first, procedural prong. 34 In a minority
of the cases, the courts applied the alternative step two of a loss to the
student’s parents.35
B. IDEA 2004 Codification
Although the specific contours of the second step were consistent
in this substantial body of post-Rowley procedural FAPE case law,36
the 2004 IDEA amendments adopted the two-step harmless error
approach as follows:
In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing
officer may find that a child did not receive a . . .
[FAPE] only if the procedural inadequacies–(I)
impeded the child's right to a . . . [FAPE]; (II)
significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to
participate in the decision-making [sic] process
regarding the provision of a . . . [FAPE] to the parents’
child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational
benefits.37
[the child] with any educational benefit”); T.S., 265 F.3d at 1093 n.2 (“If there has
been no substantive deprivation, procedural defects do not amount to a denial of
FAPE”).
34
See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07 and accompanying text for two-pronged
test.
35
E.g., Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 812
(5th Cir. 2003) (“[whether the] procedural deficiency resulted in a loss of
educational opportunity or infringed his parents' opportunity to participate in the
IEP process”); W.G. ex rel. R.G. v. Bd. of Tr. of Target Range Sch. Dist., 960 F.2d
1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992) (“procedural inadequacies that result in the loss of
educational opportunity . . . or seriously infringe the parents' opportunity to
participate in the IEP formulation process). Although courts have similarly not
been clear or consistent in differentiating substantive and procedural rights, it would
appear that this parental right is mixed but ultimately substantive. E.g., Winkelman
v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007) (“We conclude IDEA grants
parents independent, enforceable rights. These rights, which are not limited to
certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the entitlement to
a free appropriate public education for the parents' child”).
36
E.g., Romberg, supra note 31, at 429–30 (concluding, under the rubric of
“judicial chaos,” that the Rowley progeny “often referred to the Supreme Court’s
insistence on the primary importance of the IDEA’s procedural protections, but
were at a loss when attempting to figure out what those protections actually
meant”); Perry A. Zirkel, Parental Participation: The Paramount Procedural
Requirement under the IDEA?, 15 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 1, 5–11 (2016) (Parental
Participation) (using the wavering line of Ninth Circuit decisions illustrates the lack
of clarity and consistency).
37
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2017). Because the first prong appears to
serve only as a general introduction, the second and third prongs amount to the
alternative requisite losses to the child or the parents.
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As Romberg observed, an adjudicative interpretation of this
codification as making the procedural protections of the Act
superfluous would be “misguided.”38 But, what has been the
prevailing adjudicative treatment and what should it be?
C. Post-2004 Judicial Interpretation
Illustrating the effect of this IDEA 2004 provision, a systematic
analysis of a representative sample of the IEP related procedural
FAPE court decisions revealed that most of these claims were
unsuccessful.39 More specifically, upon the courts’ application of the
two-step test, the outcome was conclusively in the plaintiffs’ favor in
only 18% of the claims.40 Even though the parents asserted an
average of two procedural violations per case, they fared almost as
poorly upon reanalyzing the case outcomes on a best-for-plaintiff
basis.41 Similarly, a procedural claims analysis of parental
participation at steps one and two from 2007 to 2015 found that the
plaintiffs fared poorly and in almost half of the cases the court failed
to cite the applicable statutory standard. 42
Although special education experts regard the IEP’s specialized
components as proactive and substantive,43 findings suggest that
many courts consider them procedural and, thus, subject to the
relaxed two-step analysis.44 For example, an analysis of the judicial
rulings specific to transition services, which the IDEA requires for
bridging to post-secondary education or employment,45 found that the
outcomes were largely in favor of districts, often based on the two-

38
Romberg, supra note 31, at 440–41. However, his assertion that the previous
scholarly commentary adopted this interpretation seems to be an overstatement.
39
Zirkel & Hetrick, supra note 20, at 225–26.
40
Id. at 225.
41
Specifically, on a case-by-case rather than claim-by-claim basis, courts ruled
conclusively in favor of the plaintiff-parents in 25% of the cases, with an additional
4% being inconclusive (i.e., subject to further proceedings). Id. at 226.
42
Parental Participation, supra note 36, at 19–20. If hearing officers and
courts more robustly applied this alternative statutory standard for the requisite loss
for denial of FAPE, the need for the proposed solution would not be so acutely
broad-based.
43
See generally Julie J. Weatherly, IEP Disasters: Common Procedural and
Substantive Mistakes to Avoid, Nebraska/Kansas Regional Special Education
Conference (Nov. 7, 2008) in Julie J. Weatherly, IEP Disasters: Common
Procedural and Substantive Mistakes to Avoid, THERASHARE 1, 14, 19 (2008),
http://www.therashare.net/files/KSDEIEPDisasters.pdf (characterizing measurable
goals and transition services as substantive).
44
E.g., M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d
1189, 1194–1201 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Elevating the Standard for FAPE, supra
note 27, at 500.
45
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(I)(VIII) (2017).
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step procedural approach.46 Under this approach, most courts applied
step two globally to the IEP rather than specifically to the transition
component, eviscerating the statutory compliance specifications for
transition services.47 A more dramatic example is the judiciary’s
treatment of the IDEA’s seemingly proactive provisions and corollary
state special education laws for functional behavioral assessments
(FBAs) and behavior intervention plans (BIPs). 48 Successive
empirical analyses revealed an increasingly pro-district skew in FBA
and BIP rulings, with the two-step approach being predominant. 49 In
the most recent six-year period, the judicial outcomes favored the
districts 7:1, and the rulings in New York, which has the strongest
FBA-BIP law, were not significantly more parent favorable. 50

46

Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of the Judicial Rulings for Transition Services
under the IDEA, 41 CAREER DEV. & TRANSITION FOR EXCEPTIONAL INDIVIDUALS
136 (2018). The overall outcomes ratio of the rulings was 3:1 in favor of districts,
with this pro-district skew particularly pronounced for the federal appellate courts
and in the most recent segment of the sixteen-year period. Id. at 141.
47
Id. at 141–42 (citing also the limited exception of Gibson v. Forest Hills Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 655 F. App’x 423 (6th Cir. 2016)).
48
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(I) (2017) (implicit special consideration in the
IEP); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii); 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(k)(1)(F)(i) (explicit
requirement for disciplinary changes in placement). For the corollary state laws,
see Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Functional Behavioral Assessments and
Behavior Intervention Plans: An Update, 45 COMMUNIQUÉ 4 (Nov. 2016); Perry
Zirkel, State Special Education Laws for Functional Behavioral Assessments and
Behavior Intervention Plans, 36 BEHAV. DISORDERS 262 (2011).
49
Perry A. Zirkel, An Update of Judicial Rulings Specific to FBAs or BIPs
under the IDEA and Corollary State Laws, 51 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 50 (2017) (Judicial
Rulings Specific to FBAs or BIPs); Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional
Behavioral Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis,
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133 (2011).
50
Judicial Rulings Specific to FBAs or BIPs, supra note 49, at 53–54.
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Moreover, courts extended this largely fatal two-step approach to
the fuller gamut of procedural claims, 51 even to violations of the
procedural requirements for impartial hearing decisions.52 The most
glaring examples are child find53 claims because they are at the root of
the entire identification and FAPE process, being directly before a
child’s eligibility determination.54 A growing line of court decisions
have concluded that if a district violates its child find obligation but the
record lacks an ultimate determination that the child is eligible under
the Act, the parent is without any remedy, effectively including 55
attorneys’ fees.56
This adjudicative conclusion eviscerates the child find duty in the
51

See supra note 19 for the fuller range beyond the IEP process.
E.g., Pangerl v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist., 780 F. App’x 505, 507 (9th Cir.
2019); J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 69–70 (2d Cir. 2000);
Heather S. ex rel. Kathy S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1059–60 (7th Cir. 1997);
Amman v. Stow Sch. Sys., 982 F.2d 644, 653 (1st Cir. 1993).
53
Courts have interpreted the IDEA’s child find provision, 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(3) (2017), as referring to school districts’ ongoing affirmative obligation to
evaluate a child after reasonably suspecting that the child may be eligible under the
Act. E.g., W.A. ex rel. W.E. v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 126
(2d Cir. 2019); Krawietz v. Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 673 (5th Cir.
2018); Mr. P v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735 (2d Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018); M.G. v. Williamson Cty. Sch., 720 F. App’x 280
(6th Cir. 2018); D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012). For
illustrative overviews, see Perry A. Zirkel, An Adjudicative Checklist for Child Find
and Eligibility under the IDEA, 357 EDUC. L. REP. 30 (2018); Perry A. Zirkel,
“Child Find”: The Lore v. the Law, 307 EDUC. L. REP. 574 (2014).
54
Moreover, child find is not the only area of the IDEA’s procedural
requirements that is beyond the technical scope of the child’s eligibility. Other
examples include the disciplinary protections for “students not yet eligible for
special education” what is commonly referred to as the “response to intervention”
(RTI) provision for identification of students with learning disabilities and the
requirements for evaluations more generally. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5) (2017); 20
U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(B) (2017); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)–(c) (2017).
55
Technically, attorneys’ fees are not a remedy. Awards of Attorney’s Fees by
Federal Courts and Federal Agencies, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 1 (Oct. 22, 2009),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20091022_94970_5ca462bf2eacfb4f483fcf98bd90d9e7313257af.pdf. However, the IDEA’s fee
shifting provisions are essential to effective litigation, especially but not at all
exclusively for poor parents and for students in states with limited availability of
specialized counsel. E.g., Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the
IDEA: Collaborative in Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 423, 451–54 (2012) (pointing out the significant role and expense of
attorneys in the IDEA context); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCH. ON
CIVIL RIGHTS (2000), http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan252000 (proposing
publicly funded IDEA attorneys).
56
E.g., Burnett v. San Mateo Foster City Sch. Dist., 739 F. App’x 870, 872 (9th
Cir. 2018); T.B. v. Prince George’s Cty. Bd. of Educ., 897 F.3d 566, 578 (4th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1307 (2019); Durbrow v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 887
F.3d 1182, 1196 (11th Cir. 2018); D.G. v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 481 F.
App’x 887, 893 (5th Cir. 2012); D.S. ex rel. Z.S. v. Neptune Twp. Bd. of Educ.,
264 F. App’x 186, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2008); T.W. ex rel. K.J. v. Leander Indep. Sch.
52
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various cases where the district has reasonable suspicion of the child’s
eligibility and does not conduct a timely evaluation, 57 but the parents
fail to prove that the child was eligible.58 Both of these contingencies
present significant problems in ultimately adjudicating eligibility. The
first challenge is based on changes in the child during the interim that
may affect eligibility,59 particularly because the hearing process and
judicial appeals prolong the interim period from six months to twoyears.60 The second contingency increases the possibility of eligibility
changes due to the time-consuming process of IDEA adjudication. 61 It
also can serve as an incentive reinforcing districts’ failure to fulfill their
evaluation obligation, for the following reasons in addition to the usual
parental difficulties of litigating against their school district. 62 Under
Dist., 74 IDELR ¶ 12 (W.D. Tex. 2019); D.F. ex rel. Evans v. Sacramento Unified
Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 164 (E.D. Cal. 2014); cf. J.G. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist.,
2014 WL 12576617 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014); E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro
Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 41 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 652 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (default rationale). Indeed, in some cases
even if the child was eligible, the child find violation has resulted in no remedy.
E.g., J.N. v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 75 IDELR ¶ 153 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (parent did
not provide preponderant proof that the erroneous finding of ineligibility amounted
to a denial of FAPE in light of the general intervention services that led to the child
find violation).
57
For the successive reasonable suspicion and reasonable period, timely
evaluation, or dimensions of child find, see supra note 53.
58
Although most of these cases are in the wake of an untimely evaluation,
others arise after the lack of a district eligibility evaluation. E.g., T.W. ex rel. K.J.
v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., 74 IDELR ¶ 12 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
59
Cf. D.K. ex rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 251 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“The mere fact that a subsequent evaluation of [the child] yielded a
different result—i.e., he was found [eligible] in November 2007 but did not qualify
in April 2006—does not necessarily render the earlier testing inadequate”).
60
First, the filing for the hearing may be for up to two years after the parents
have reason to know of the child find violation. E.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch.
Auth., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying the IDEA statute of limitations to a
child find claim). Second, the majority of impartial hearings are not adjudicated
within the seventy-five day timeline of the IDEA regulations, which allow for
extensions upon the request of either party. E.g., CADRE, Dispute Resolution
Summary for U.S. and Outlying Areas 2008–09 to 2017–18,
https://www.cadreworks.org/sites/default/files/resources/201718%20DR%20Data%20Summary%20-%20U.S.%20and%20Outlying%20Areas.pd
f (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (reporting that 27% of hearings were adjudicated
within the regulatory timeline for 2017 to 2018). Third, for the hearing officer
decisions that are appealed, the period until the final decision often extends to
subsequent grades in the student’s school career. E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Autism
Litigation under the IDEA, 24 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 92, 94 (2011) (finding
average of 2.8 years from time of filing for hearing until final court decision for a
seventeen-year sample of autism cases).
61
See supra notes 59–60.
62
In general education, to litigate on behalf of their child against the child’s
school, parents face daunting problems that are not only economic in terms of
access to and affordability of sufficiently specialized attorneys, but also emotional
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the IDEA, (1) parents shoulder the burden of persuasion at due process
hearings63 with the exception of the few jurisdictions where state law
provides otherwise, 64 and (2) even if they prevail, parents are not
entitled to expert witness fees. 65
Yet since the latest IDEA amendments, courts have maintained the
substantive standard of FAPE, which is more generally the basis of the
eviscerating effect of step two, at a district friendly level without
dramatic change despite three successive developments. 66 The first
two were the general purpose and peer-reviewed research (PRR)
provisions of the 2004 amendments of the IDEA, 67 which made no
significant difference in lower court outcomes despite notable
advocacy in scholarly commentary.68 More recently and dramatically,
the Supreme Court’s Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-

in terms of the adversarial participation in and consequences of the adjudicative
process. These general problems are all the more difficult for parents of children in
special education in relation to attorney specialization and student vulnerability.
See Kristen Taketa, Families Endure Costly Legal Fights Trying to Get the Right
Special Education Services, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-10-06/legal-fights-families-specialeducation-services.
63
Schaffer ex rel. Schaeffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (ruling that the
burden of persuasion in an impartial hearing under the IDEA is on the challenging
party, i.e., the one seeking relief). In procedural violation cases, the challenging
party is the parent. See id.
64
Only a handful of state laws —Delaware, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
with Connecticut leaving the matter to the discretion of the hearing officer—place
the burden of persuasion on the school district. Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due
Process Hearings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 3, 31 n.93 (2018). Moreover, the Supreme
Court left open the question of whether its ruling preempts the aforementioned state
laws that provide otherwise. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61–62.
65
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 292
(2006).
66
See Endrew F. ex rel. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988, 997 (2017); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07.
67
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d) (2017) (emphasizing, inter alia, “educational results”)
and 1414(d)(1)(A)(III) (2017) (requiring the IEP provisions for special education
and related services to be “based on peer-reviewed research to the extent
practicable”).
68
E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Razed Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standard for
“Free Appropriate Public Education”?, 28 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
396 (2008) (tracing commentators’ proposals and the courts’ interpretation of the
purpose and PRR provisions of IDEA 2004). Although the relevant judicial
interpretations of the purpose language ended in the first few years after the 2004
amendments, the continuing line of cases interpreting PRR have remained in the
districts’ favor. E.g., Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., 926 F.3d 942 (8th Cir.
2019); E.M. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 763 F. App’x 361 (5th Cir. 2019);
Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2012); Joshua A. v. Rocklin
Unified Sch. Dist., 319 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
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169 revisited and refined the substantive prong in Rowley.70 Yet the
reformulation of “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances” 71 has not
significantly changed the judicial outcomes in the many subsequent
lower court cases.72
D. Alternate Forum Interpretation
This two-step approach, which reduces procedural violations
largely to technical and unenforced issues in the adjudicative arena, is
in clear contrast with the prevailing approach in the alternative
decisional dispute resolution avenue under the IDEA. 73 In most states,
the complaint procedures avenue, which is an investigative rather than
adjudicative process, takes a strict one-step approach. 74 Thus, in
comparison to the adjudicative arena, this forum meaningfully enforces
compliance with the procedural requirements of the IDEA.
III. THE REMEDIAL SOLUTION
Although hearing officers, review officers, and courts have almost
entirely ignored the solution to their effective evisceration of the
procedural requirements of the Act, it is explicitly in tandem with the
codification of the two-step test. 75
Specifically, the same
69

Endrew F. ex rel. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 991–93.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
71
Endrew F. ex rel. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999–1001.
72
Perry A. Zirkel, The Aftermath of Endrew F.: An Outcomes Analysis Two
Years Later, 363 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4 (2019) (finding that only five of the seventyfive judicial applications of the new substantive standard under Endrew F. resulted
in a change from a ruling in favor of the district to a ruling in favor of the parent).
73
See Perry A. Zirkel, The Complaint Procedures Avenue of the IDEA: Has the
Road Less Traveled By Made All The Difference?, 30 J. OF SPECIAL EDUC. &
LEADERSHIP 88, 88 (2017).
74
E.g., An Empirical Comparison, supra note 12, at 183 (finding that parents’
success rate was twice as high for procedural FAPE claims in the complaints
procedures than the impartial hearing venue, with even more dramatic disparities in
the success rate for child find, evaluation, notice, and discipline claims).
75
Romberg proposed a much more theoretical structural approach based on the
principles of contracts, collaboration, and individualization and that meshed with
the three subparts of the aforementioned. Romberg, supra note 31, at 449–66; 20
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2017). However, his approach ignored the
accompanying statutory solution and the remedy of prospective procedural
correction. Infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. Moreover, his approach has
not gained any judicial traction, with citations limited to the peripheral use of
distinguishing between procedural and substantive FAPE. R.S. ex rel. Soltes v. Bd.
of Dir. of Woods Charter Sch. Co., 73 IDELR ¶ 252 (M.D.N.C. 2019); Beckwith v.
District of Columbia, 208 F. Supp. 3d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 2016); J.T. ex rel. A.T. v.
Dumont, 58 IDELR ¶ 229 (D.N.J. 2012) (referring to the two-step approach for
procedural FAPE).
70
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aforementioned76 codification of the two-step test ends its elucidation
of step two with the following caveat: “Nothing in this subparagraph
shall be construed to preclude a hearing officer from ordering a local
educational agency to comply with procedural requirements under this
section.”77
Thus, in light of their broad equitable authority under the IDEA,78
hearing officers could and should issue prospective injunctive relief to
rectify the procedural violation or violations. Such relief may include,
for example, ordering the revision of pertinent policies or procedures,
training the child’s violating staff members, or a corrective procedural
redo.79 The two relevant subsets of child find cases80 serve as effective
examples. Under this statutorily authorized solution, those child find
cases lacking any evaluation should typically result in an order for an
evaluation. 81 Those with delayed but defensible determination of
ineligibility could result in an order for child find training for the
violating staff members or for a revision in the district’s child find
procedures. 82 The general purpose, as any equitable relief, is to be
justly tailored to the scope and nature of the violation. 83 The more
specific purpose in these cases is to restore the procedural dimension
of the Act to a more balanced and effective position aligned with the
statute’s overall structure84 and specific language.85

76

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2017).
Id. Recently, the administering agency for the IDEA added indirect support
via this guidance: “The SEA, pursuant to its general supervisory responsibility . . .
must ensure that a hearing officer's decision is implemented in a timely manner,
unless either party appeals the decision. This is true even if the hearing officer's
decision includes only actions to ensure procedural violations do not recur and no
child-specific action is ordered.” Letter to Zirkel, 74 IDELR ¶ 171 (OSEP 2019).
78
Letter to Kohn, 17 IDELR 522 (OSEP 1991) (“based upon the facts and
circumstances of each individual case, an impartial hearing officer has the authority
to grant any relief he/she deems necessary”); see generally Perry A. Zirkel, The
Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: The Latest Update, 37 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 505 (2018). The exception is for the awarding of attorneys’ fees. Id. at
555–56.
79
Id. at 536–54. The alternatives of policy or training orders must be equitably
specific to the scope of the case. E.g., J.N. ex rel. M.N. v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 75 IDELR ¶ 153 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (denying requested district-wide training
order in the absence of evidence of systemic child-find violations).
80
Supra note 58.
81
E.g., Student with a Disability, 63 IDELR ¶ 205 (Utah SEA 2014).
82
E.g., District of Columbia Pub. Sch.,120 LRP 184 (D.C. SEA 2019).
83
E.g., Branham v. District of Columbia, 427 F.3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(emphasizing the need for an inquiry that is “above all, tailored to the unique needs
of the disabled student”).
84
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06.
85
Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
77
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To date, the use of this corrective remedial authority has been
relatively rare and largely limited to the hearing officer level. 86 The
even more limited judicial authority supports this approach. For
example, in Dawn G. v. Mabank Independent School District 87 the
court rejected the school district’s contention that the hearing officer’s
prospective procedural remedies were ultra vires after ruling that the
district met the substantive standard for FAPE. 88 Observing that the
hearing officer did not comply with some procedural requirements, the
court cited the aforementioned 89 IDEA provision in upholding the
hearing officer’s orders.90
Other examples do not cite the statutory solution, but provide at
least secondary support in the child find context. First, presenting a
mixed example, another federal court upheld a hearing officer’s order
for a new evaluation as a result of a child find violation.91 The district
appealed, contending that its child find violation amounted to harmless
error due to its determination that the child was not eligible. 92 The
court rejected this claim for mixed reasons.93 In part, the substantive
loss to the student remained in question because, in agreeing with the
hearing officer that the district’s evaluation was not sufficiently
comprehensive, the court reasoned that the result “may mean” that the
child was eligible.94 However, in an overlapping part, the child find
86

E.g., Phila. Sch. Dist., 118 LRP 19611 (Pa. SEA Feb. 9, 2018) (finding no
substantial denial of FAPE but ordering correction of procedural defects of IEP);
Boston Pub. Sch., 69 IDELR ¶ 25 (Mass. SEA 2016) (finding de minimis denial of
FAPE to date but ordering specified completion of evaluation and contingent IEP
team consideration of compensatory education); Red Lion Area Sch. Dist., 115 LRP
12726 (Pa. SEA Mar. 9, 2015) (finding no substantive denial of FAPE but issuing
various orders to correct procedural violations); Mabank Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 LRP
2115 (Tex. SEA Sept. 12, 2012); D.C. Pub. Sch., 111 LRP 20046 (D.C. SEA Aug.
20, 2010) (finding no substantial denial of FAPE but ordering district to issue prior
written notice to parent); cf. District of Columbia, 117 LRP 21233 (D.C. SEA
2017); Highlands Cty. Sch. Bd., 115 LRP 27365 (Fla. SEA 2015); Walker Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 111 LRP 48174 (Ala. SEA 2011); Student with a Disability, 109 LRP
17648 (Va. SEA 2008a); Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 30 (Ga. SEA 2007)
(ordering a new manifestation determination as a result of procedural violations in
the first manifestation determination).
87
Dawn G. ex rel. D.B. v. Mabank Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D.
Tex. 2014).
88
Dawn G. ex rel. D.B., 63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
89
Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
90
Dawn G. ex rel. D.B., 63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
91
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413 v. H.M.J. ex rel. A.J., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1108
(D. Minn. 2019).
92
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1111.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1111; cf. Hoover City Bd. of Educ. v. Leventry ex rel. K.M., 75 IDELR
¶ 32 (N.D. Ala. 2019); Wimbish v. D.C., 381 F. Supp. 3d 22, 36–38 (D.D.C. 2019)
(illustrating remedy of an order for evaluation in the context of an eligibility
determination was open to question in light of a defective evaluation).
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violation resulted in deprivation of meaningful parental participation. 95
In the second example, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed a child
find violation in the unusual situation in which the district found the
child ineligible, but the parents withdrew this issue from the appeal. 96
The court reasoned that “a school district’s duty to [timely] evaluate
children for eligibility under the IDEA is not dependent upon the
ultimate determination that the child is ‘disabled.’” 97 Based on this
reasoning, the court upheld the hearing officer’s order for
reimbursement of the independent educational evaluation (IEE). 98
However, limiting the remedy in the absence of a substantive denial of
FAPE, the court reversed the hearing officer’s other reimbursement
order, which was for the private tutoring expenses that the parents had
incurred.99
A final, more peripheral example arose within the specialized
context of the IDEA’s requirement for a manifestation determination
upon a disciplinary change in placement. 100 A federal district court in
Pennsylvania upheld a hearing officer’s order to conduct another
manifestation determination review based on “significant procedural
flaws” in its first review.101
This proposed approach has the added advantage of closing the gap
between the hearing officer and complaint procedures avenues of
decisional dispute resolution, 102 thus mitigating forum shopping and
95

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1112. Whether this parental
prong argument applies more generally in response to child find harmless error
cases depends at least in part as to whether the underlying rationale is lack of
eligibility generally or lack of FAPE specifically. Id. In any event, the proposed
solution of a prospective procedural remedy tailored to the violation remains
applicable to the cases otherwise lacking any remedy at all. Id.
96
J.P. ex rel. P.P. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 260 P.3d 285, 286 (Alaska 2011).
97
Id. at 293.
98
Although in comparison to most cases of IEEs at public expense, this
prospective remedy is unusual, the court pointed to the “unique circumstances” of
the case, specifically the district’s use of the parents’ IEE “and the inadequacy of
alternative remedies.” Id. at 294–95.
99
Id. at 292–93.
100
Supra note 48.
101
Bristol Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Z.B. ex rel. K.B., 67 IDELR ¶ 9 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
However, this case is only partially supportive due to the fuzzy boundary between
procedural and substantive violations, as evidenced in the tandem order for
compensatory education. Id.
102
The reason for the disparity is the prevailing one-step approach to
procedural FAPE in the complaint procedures forum. Supra note 74 and
accompanying text. Interestingly, in the pertinent provision of the IDEA Congress
noted the interconnection of the two decision dispute resolution avenues with regard
to procedural issues. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(F) (2017) (clarifying that the prescribed
adjudicatory treatment of procedural FAPE does not affect the complaint
procedures alternative). Another potential gap-closing activity is whatever extent
that state education agencies implement the OSEP guidance to enforce technical, or
step one only violations identified in either complaint procedures or due process
hearing decisions. E.g., Letter to Copenhaver, 53 IDELR ¶ 165 (OSEP 2008).
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deferral issues. 103 It also closes the gap between the procedural
orientation of state education department compliance supervision 104
and local education professional development. 105 In doing so, it
provides enforceable meaning to the “elaborate and highly specific
procedural safeguards” that are the backbone of the Act and for which
compliance is at least as important as the substantive dimension. 106 If
indeed the legal emphasis instead should be on substantive
outcomes, 107 Congress should amend the Act accordingly to
intentionally degrade the procedural dimension. Unless and until
Congress evinces such intent, adjudicators should follow the overall
structure of the Act and fulfill their specific authority for prospective
procedural remedies.
This adjudicative approach not only corrects the violation for the
child, but also triggers the potential for the recovery of attorneys’ fees
that the parents expended in proving this violation. 108 The entitlement
and the amount of attorneys’ fees are not automatic, with the court
having discretion within a rather carefully balanced set of criteria in the
Act. 109 Thus, the relatively limited pertinent case law is divided
depending on the circumstances. 110
Finally, hearing officers, in light of their pivotal position in the
IDEA’s adjudicative system,111 are potentially the leaders in moving
103

E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Questionable Initiation of Both Decisional Dispute
Resolution Processes under the IDEA: Proposed Regulatory Interpretations, 49 J.
L. & EDUC. 99 (2020) (discussing problems in the agency’s policy interpretations of
the interconnection of these two decisional avenues).
104
E.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a), 1415(a) (2017) (specifying compliance
requirements for state eligibility generally and procedural safeguards specifically).
105
See generally BARBARA D. BATEMAN & MARY ANN LINDEN, BETTER IEPS:
HOW TO DEVELOP LEGALLY CORRECT AND EDUCATIONALLY USEFUL PROGRAMS
(2012); BARBARA D. BATEMAN & CYNTHIA M. HERR, WRITING MEASURABLE IEP
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES (2006) (illustrating prevailing emphasis on adhering to the
procedural specifications of the IDEA for IEP content and process).
106
See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06.
107
E.g., Elevating the Standard for FAPE, supra note 27 (advocating statutory
raising of the substantive standard in response to the corresponding erosion of the
procedural dimension).
108
Given the significant role and expense of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA
(supra note 55), this added factor adds to the balance-restoring nature of the
proposed solution by reinforcing the districts’ incentive for procedural compliance
and the parents’ sense of vindicating utility rather than frustrating futility.
109
20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(3) (2017).
110
Compare Sykes v. D.C., 870 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91–92 (D.D.C. 2012)
(awarding attorneys’ fees), with Dawn G. ex rel. D.B. v. Mabank Indep. Sch. Dist.,
63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (declining to award attorneys’ fees). For a court
that awarded partial attorneys’ fees within a more comprehensive consideration of
the equitable relief based on the particular circumstances, including the relief that
the parents’ sought, see M.A. v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 980 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.
Conn. 2013), further proceedings, 980 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D. Conn. 2014).
111
Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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the case law in this restorative, rebalancing direction.112 Primarily113
because this proposal represents a change in their modus operandi at
the remedial stage,114 they are likely to be resistant to implement it.115
Some may indirectly blame the parent, pointing to the requirement for
the filing party to specify the requested remedy in the complaint.116
However, the counterbalancing considerations are: (1) this requirement
is conditional, 117 meaning the parent likely did not know it was an
available remedy;118 (2) “the IDEA does not necessarily limit the relief
a due process hearing officer can award to the relief a party proposes
at a given stage of the administrative process[;]”119 and (3) a formulaic
catch-all 120 consistent with the hearing officer’s remedial authority
would seem to be a superfluous solution.121 Consequently, the cost112

Interestingly, the procedural-substantive distinction may also affect the
degree of deference due for hearing officer decisions. E.g., Daniel W. MortonBentley, The Rowley Enigma: How Much Weight Is Due to IDEA Administrative
Proceedings in Federal Court?, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 428, 46267 (2016) (proposing judicial deference to substantive, not procedural, findings of
hearing officers).
113
An overlapping contributing factor is the tight regulatory timeline for
completion of the process via issuance of a written decision for both regular and
expedited hearings. 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c) (2018).
In my many years of experience as an IDEA review officer and as an IDEA hearing
officer trainer, I have found that the remedies stage of decision writing is often
given insufficient equitable care and creativity due to exhaustion in and of this
prescribed process.
114
Not only do hearing officers typically provide no remedy for procedural
violations that do not survive step two, but also more generally they only rarely
order purely prospective procedural relief. Supra note 86 and accompanying text;
e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE, 33 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214 (2013) (Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of
FAPE) (finding that only 5% of 224 hearing officer cases that granted remedies in
FAPE cases was an order for evaluation or another action beyond the substantive
content of the IEP).
115
Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE, supra note 114.
116
34 C.F.R. § 300.508(b)(6) (2018) (requiring the complaint to contain “the
proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available at the time”).
117
Id.
118
The likely lack of the requisite knowledge of this remedy is not at all limited
to pro se parents. Specialized legal counsel is lacking in many locations. E.g., Kay
Hennessey Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matter of Arons: Construction of the
IDEA's Lay Advocate Provision Too Narrow?, 9 GEORGETOWN J. POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 193, 217–19 (2002) (finding notable insufficiency of parent attorneys in
national survey).
119
E.g., Albuquerque Pub. Sch. v. Sledge, 74 IDELR ¶ 290 (D.N.M. 2019).
120
E.g., Dawn G. ex rel. D.B., 63 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (reciting
parent’s culminating request for “any [other] relief that the Hearing Officer . . .
deem[] appropriate”).
121
E.g., Letter to Kohn, 17 IDELR 522 (OSEP 1991) (stating the agency’s
position that “an impartial hearing officer has the authority to grant any relief he
[or] she deems necessary”). This authority is derived from the reviewing court’s
express and broad equitable authority to “grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(C) (2017).
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benefit balance weighs in favor of hearing officers’ actively fulfilling
their broad remedial authority to restore the meaning of the procedural
dimension of the IDEA to an equitably enforced level.

